

ABC Evening News, 6:00 P.M., July 27, 1970. Howard K. Smith



The Defense Department estimates that now only 2% of the people in South Vietnam are active Viet Cong.

The campaign to root out these remaining Communists called "Operation Phoenix" is so intense that some call it ruthless.

For a report here is ABC's George Watson in Saigon. "One of the more controversial operations launched by the CIA in Vietnam is the so called Phoenix program."

It is intended to ferret out the Viet Cong leadership or, infrastructure, as the military prefers to say, the tactics used often resemble the Gestapo on a bad night.

This unusual film was a cordon and search operation that took place in a village just south of Da Nang.

Before dawn Vietnamese military police cordoned off the area, moved into the village and systematically began rooting people out of bed and demanding their identification papers.

By these tactics and other means, Phoenix officials claim that last year they eliminated 20,000 members of the Viet Cong infrastructure. The total includes those who were killed, captured or persuaded to defect. Critics claim the figure is wildly exaggerated.

In any case, no Viet Cong leaders were rounded up in this operation. The net result was a motley collection of draft dodgers and deserters. They are hauled off to a military compound for interrogation. Before that their heads are shaved.

Opponents of the Phoenix program charge that this sort of police action only succeeds in alienating the people whose hearts and minds the government is trying to win.

For the average Vietnamese it would seem to make little difference whether they are persecuted by the Viet Cong or prosecuted by the Saigon government.

This is George Watson, ABC News, Da Nang.

How Nixon decided to invade Cambodia

BY DAVID R. MAXEY LOOK WASHINGTON EDITOR

ON THE NIGHT OF April 30, 1970, Richard Nixon announced one of the biggest decisions of his Presidency. American troops would fight in Cambodia. On April 20, the President had announced plans to withdraw 150,000 troops, over the period of a year, from Vietnam. On April 28, American troops joined with South Vietnamese in a rush across the Cambodian border. Historians will write the full story of the Cambodian decision. What follows here is a view of 11 days in April, based on interviews with the White House staff members who watched the decision being made.

The President's attention had been focused on the troubles of the Apollo 13 astronauts, as they struggled back through space from their aborted mission to the moon. Mr. Nixon flew on April 18 to Hawaii to greet them, stopping in Houston to take Lovell's and Haise's wives aboard Air Force One. The President and Mrs. Nixon spent the night in Honolulu.

The following morning, April 19, at 7:30, the President met with Adm. John McCain, Jr., commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific. McCain briefed him on Southeast Asia. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird later told reporters that McCain discussed a plan, which the President had already received from Laird, for action against enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia. Laird said that Defense planners had begun thinking of such a contingency during the latter part of March, after Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's neutralist chief of state, had been deposed by Lt. Gen. Lon Nol on March 18.

The McCain briefing covered more than the Cambodian situation, however. A key White House aide calls it "one more in-put, not pivotal." At least, there was then no presidential plan for an incursion into Cambodia.

The President took Mrs. Nixon to church at Honolulu's Little Stone Church. That afternoon, the Nixons flew east to San Clemente, Calif. McCain was with them, to give Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the same briefing the next day.

Monday, April 20

SO THE President was ready for his speech. He worked through the morning at his Western White House office until 2 p.m., then returned to the Nixon residence.

At 2:15, Kissinger heard McCain's briefing. They finished up in half an hour and walked together to the President's library.

On the afternoon of the 20th, the ante seemed to go up in Cambodia. Communist forces had attacked two cities, Snoul and Takeo. They held Saang, immediately southeast of Phnompenh, the Cambodian capital.

Kissinger had received similar reports of enemy activity before, on March 29, Easter Sunday, while he was on vacation. At that time, it was not clear what the enemy was up to, and Kissinger had elected not to interrupt his vacation with a high-alarm trip to Washington. Even now, the need was for more information, and Kissinger did not discuss the reports with the President in any significant way before his speech.

At his home, the President finished up the afternoon's work and returned to the Western White House by golf cart for his 6 p.m. speech. When it was over, the President and Mrs. Nixon boarded a helicopter, with H. R. "Bob" Haldeman, Assistant to the President, and Kissinger. They flew to El Toro Marine Air Station and boarded Air Force One for the long flight to Washington. Aides note that it was highly unusual for the President to

at night, since the three-hour time lag would bring him home well after midnight. "Maybe," says an aide, "he smelled a big decision coming."

If so, there was no indication of it aboard Air Force One. The conversation was about the speech the President had just delivered, how it had gone. Mr. Nixon was on an Air Force One phone a number of times, calling around the country to personal friends to get their reactions. The plane landed at Andrews Air Force Base at 1:26 a.m., and the President got to bed at 2:00.

Tuesday, April 21

MR. NIXON arrived in the Oval Office at 7:15 a.m., stepping out for a few minutes to walk alone in the Rose Garden. At 7:35, he entered the Roosevelt Room, where John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, was chairing the usual early morning meeting of his staff. Naturally, the President got the floor. He mused about how day-to-day struggles to get something done were important enough, but that the staff should not lose sight of the long run, that the important thing about any program or decision was the end result, not the difficulties encountered along the way.

The President left Ehrlichman's meeting at 8:20, returned to the Oval Office and worked alone until 9:32. Kissinger arrived for his daily morning meeting with the President. This morning, at the President's request, Kissinger had with him Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Nixon was hunting for more data about Cambodia.

The enemy, the President was told, was still on the offense. One aide remembers thinking that the information the President was receiving lent "new poignancy" to the urgent requests for aid pouring from the Lon Nol government. Mr. Nixon ordered a meeting of the National Security

Council for the next day.

At 12:12, the President walked from the Oval Office out through the White House west basement to his office in the east wing of the Executive Office Building. The President's EOB quarters are smaller and warmer than the tradition-soaked Oval Office. The Theodore Roosevelt desk sits on a beige rug facing two lighted cabinets filled with Oriental art—plates, vases, statuary. On shelves behind the desk are the President's collections of elephant statues and gavels. There is also a golf score card to enshrine the fact that on Labor Day, 1961, Mr. Nixon shot a hole-in-one.

Late that afternoon, Laird and Kissinger met with the President at the EOB office. They briefed Mr. Nixon on military matters in Cambodia, which led to a discussion of the enemy's new aggressiveness, as the three understood it, and how it would affect the Vietnamization program and the President's hopes for withdrawing troops. The meeting broke up at 6:25, and the President returned to the White House for a dinner honoring Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo of Nationalist China.

The President left the festivities at 10:18 and went upstairs to the Lincoln Sitting Room.

The Lincoln Sitting Room is a haven from majesty. A brown-velour chair with matching footstool sits in one corner, looking used, almost battered, and very comfortable. There is a small marble fireplace with a couch opposite, and a coffee table under a pile of records that shows a presidential fondness for Eugene Ormandy and the Philadelphia Orchestra. In this sanctuary, the President worked until 1 a.m.

Wednesday, April 22

AT 8:25 A.M., Kissinger sat down in his office with Ray S. Cline, Director of Intelligence and Research for the State Department. They reviewed Cline's information about enemy activity in Cambodia. It matched what Laird had told Kissinger and the President the day before.

The President was in the Oval Office at 8:50. Kissinger arrived there at 9:14, with Helms following a few minutes later. They talked until 10:00, when Kissinger left for a meeting with Lt. Gen. John Vogt, Director J-3 (Operations) for the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Kissinger listened hard to Vogt, deliberately for the level just below that of the Joint Chiefs, to hear an-

other said the day before. Kissinger regards that kind of listening as part of his job—to hear the conviction or lack of it in a man's voice, to test with questions how certain the man reporting feels. Vogt's report also matched what Laird and Helms had said the day before and also fit Ray Cline's view of enemy activity.

At 11:25, Mr. Nixon walked in on the Kissinger-Vogt discussion. He listened for 20 minutes, then asked both men to come to his office when they were finished. They got to the Oval Office shortly after noon.

After lunch, the President met alone with Press Secretary Ron Ziegler, then went alone to the Rose Garden at 2:30 and sat in a wicker-chair facing back toward the Oval Office. He worked there for 30 minutes until Kissinger walked out to say that the National Security Council was ready in the Cabinet Room.

In addition to the President, the NSC consists of the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, now Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln. Other men may meet with the NSC if the President wishes. Attorney General John Mitchell has met with the NSC since the beginning of the Nixon Administration, as has Kissinger. Both were there for this meeting. Adm. Thomas Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations, sat in, representing Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, who was undergoing his pre-retirement physical. CIA chief Richard Helms was also present.

By the time the National Security Council convened, this much seemed clear to the Administration: the enemy was altering the status quo in Cambodia. First, the Lon Nol government was in serious trouble. It was probably not able, because of the poor state of training of its army, to use a massive infusion of U.S. arms aid even if the Administration wanted to send it. The Administration did not. It sounded like the beginnings of another Vietnam. Moving out of the sanctuaries they had occupied during the Sihanouk regime, the enemy seemed to be trying to establish a larger belt of territory inside Cambodia, perhaps with the idea of taking over the entire country, or at least setting up a provisional government. In any case, the presence of a larger increased capability of inflicting casualties on U.S. troops in South Viet-

the situation, which was certainly not lost on the Administration, was that without a well-organized sanctuary system, the enemy's ability to inflict casualties and slow Vietnamization would be reduced for some time.

At the NSC meeting that afternoon, a consensus emerged that the U.S. should take some action that would best serve its own interests in Vietnam—protecting American forces and the Vietnamization program—

rather than rush arms to the Cambodians. There was sentiment for some sort of direct action—the possibility of using U.S. troops was raised—but the consensus at this point was for action by South Vietnamese troops, without American advisers but with U.S. air support and American air controllers to direct it.

The President, as a matter of practice, does not make final decisions at the NSC table. The group finished up at 4:42. Later that day, the President authorized detailed planning for a South Vietnamese incursion against the Communist sanctuaries in the Parrot's Beak, 35 miles west of Saigon. He had not decided that the mission should take place, but the authorization for planning would let the responsible agencies get ready to go if he gave the word.

Thursday, April 23

KISSINGER called a meeting of the Washington Special Action Group, WSAG, to begin the planning. WSAG was born after April 15, 1969, when a U.S. EC-121 electronic intelligence plane was shot down near North Korea. It is WSAG's business to contemplate what the U.S. will do in a hypothetical crisis. The group develops complete political and military "scenarios"—intelligence watches, when military units move, when foreign governments will be notified of U.S. actions.

The membership of WSAG: Kissinger, as chairman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Gen. Earle Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Helms of CIA, and, in this instance, Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

In more serene times, WSAG plans for events that have not yet happened, working first on events they think are most likely to happen. When the group assembled on April 23, a member reports, there was no plan

on paper for an incursion in Cambodia. It had been an action deemed highly unlikely while Prince Sihanouk ruled. So instead of the relative luxury of updating an existing contingency plan, WSAG was starting from the ground up. Previously, in late March, WSAG had thought in terms of minimum aid, like a shipment of AK-47 rifles, to the Lon Nol government.

After the meeting, Kissinger met with Green alone for a few minutes, then with both Packard and Admiral Moorer, who was sitting in for General Wheeler. These small after-meeting talks are a pedagogical habit of Kissinger's, designed to make sure that both he and the other men are clear about who is to do what. Then Kissinger reported on the meeting to the President, finishing at 1:34.

WSAG met again that evening at 7:20, with most of the members in black tie for a dinner at the Chinese Embassy. There were jokes about "black-tie contingency meetings." The men exchanged information gathered during the day, and brought each other up to date on the planning for the Parrot's Beak.

After dinner with Mrs. Nixon and Tricia, the President went to the Lincoln Sitting Room. He made a number of calls to Kissinger that night. The burden of his questions "was whether an incursion by South Vietnamese troops at the Parrot's Beak was enough. If it was worth going into some sanctuaries, why not others? The questions implied an incursion by American troops, because U.S. divisions occupied the Vietnamese side of the border opposite the Fishhook area of Cambodia, north of the Parrot's Beak."

The President and Kissinger also discussed the American Embassy in Phnompenh. It was a small staff, designed originally to get along with the neutralist regime of Sihanouk. Could that same staff handle the diplomatic end of an American incursion into Cambodia?

In a late call, the President told Kissinger he wanted to see plans for incursions into sanctuaries other than those in the Parrot's Beak, and that he wanted to see Kissinger, Moorer, Helms and Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr., Deputy Director of the CIA, at 7:15 the next morning.

the group he had ordered assembled the night before. General Cushman, as a former commander of I Corps in Vietnam, was there as a military adviser as well as an intelligence source. He had been Vice President Nixon's military aide in the late 1950's. The group discussed the military problems that might be involved in the movement of U.S. troops into the Fishhook.

This morning, although not necessarily at this meeting, the President made the decision that the Parrot's Beak operation should take place. South Vietnamese troops would go in without U.S. advisers. And American air support would be supplied if the South Vietnamese requested it.

After the meeting, Kissinger reviewed with each of the participants what had taken place. He saw the President briefly, then called Laird to say that the President wanted to see a plan for an operation against Base Areas 352 and 353. That was the Fishhook, where COSVN, the Communist Central Office for South Vietnam, was thought to be installed.

In the course of the conversation, Laird suggested that the White House seek congressional reaction to such a plan. Acting on the President's orders, Kissinger phoned a man he will describe only as a "senior senator." Other sources say it was Sen. John Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. The two met for nearly an hour. Kissinger outlined what actions the President was considering, both at the Parrot's Beak and at the Fishhook. Stennis was generally approving. Near the end of their talk, Kissinger put Stennis on the phone with Mr. Nixon.

The President had worked through the morning on domestic matters and he was ready to drive to Camp David, Md. for the weekend. With C.G. "Bebe" Rebozo, he left at 2:39 and arrived at 4:30. Rebozo is a close personal friend of the President's, a man to relax with. They took a swim.

Back in Washington, Kissinger had another meeting of WSAG, at 4:20 p.m. The talk was still very much about the Parrot's Beak, with relatively little time spent on the Fishhook.

Before every important decision, Kissinger looks for the arguments against a proposed U.S. action. In this case, he selected five members of his own staff, who, he thought, would be most likely to be opposed to a Cambodian incursion. That evening,

That evening, the President walked alone around Camp David for 45 minutes. In Washington, solitary walks are not available to a President.

Saturday, April 25

KISSINGER received the plans for a U.S. operation against the Fishhook from Laird. Kissinger met with John Ehrlichman, to sound him out on his views. Kissinger gave him a detailed briefing on the Cambodian operations—"more," Ehrlichman remembers, "than was really meaningful for me." He asked a number of questions about the short- and long-range effects of the sanctuaries on the Vietnamization program. He was impressed by the closeness of the sanctuaries to Saigon, and the aggressiveness of enemy movements. Ehrlichman also remembers a thought he did not express at the time: Would the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, which had gone out of business a week before, in part for lack of funds, use a Cambodian incursion to rev up its anti-war activities? But the decision seemed clear to him, and he gave his answer "right then and there." Go ahead, both at the Parrot's Beak and the Fishhook.

Kissinger also talked with one of his dissident staffers from the meeting of the night before. "He was the least emotionally against it," says Kissinger, "but he had the best reasons for not doing it." Those reasons had to do with cost effectiveness—that with an equal expenditure of effort, the U.S. would do more to bolster Vietnamization and defend its men with operations on the Vietnam side of the border. During that talk, the President called from Camp David. Were Laird's plans for the Fishhook operation ready? Told they were, Mr. Nixon asked Kissinger to bring them out.

Kissinger arrived by helicopter in time for a 1:30 hamburger with the President and Rebozo. At 2:00, the President took Kissinger to his study, and they went over the Fishhook plan. They discussed what the reactions of the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists and our own allies might be. The meeting ended at 3:45. That finished work for the day. Mr. Nixon had earlier called Secretary Rogers to ask if he wanted to go yachting that afternoon. Rogers was leaving for New York and a speech before the American Society of International Law, and couldn't go.

continued

The President, with Rebozo and Kissinger in tow, flew by helicopter to Washington Navy Yard, where they met John Mitchell and boarded the President's yacht, *Sequoia*. The cruise lasted for almost four hours, and the President returned to the White House at 8:25, and settled back in the theater to watch *Patton*, reportedly for the second time.

Sunday, April 26

AT 1:50 p.m., the President went to his office in the Executive Office Building to prepare for a meeting with the National Security Council, which started at 4:30. The meeting lasted three hours. Vice President Agnew and General Lincoln were not there this time, and General Wheeler attended on his own behalf. Otherwise, the group was the same as at the previous Wednesday's meeting.

They reviewed the plan for the Parrot's Beak and settled into a very detailed discussion of the tough one: the Fishhook. Were the benefits to be gained from the use of American forces worth the domestic uproar that was, the group felt implicitly, sure to follow? What would be the psychological effect on the Saigon government if Cambodia became one large, overt North Vietnamese sanctuary? The group discussed the existing Cambodian sanctuaries, reviewing what enemy units and supplies were in them. The President withheld his decision, and reviewed the meeting with Kissinger afterward, upstairs in the family quarters at the White House.

Monday, April 27

THE PRESIDENT told a few key aides and Cabinet members that he was leaning toward launching operations against both the Parrot's Beak and the Fishhook. One adviser told him: "Mr. President, I don't know much about domestic affairs, but if you do it, in my opinion the campuses will go up in flames." The President listened, and replied: "I want to hear that now, but if I decide to do it, I don't want to hear of it again. If I decide to do it, it will be because I have decided to pay the price."

Kissinger, Haldeman, Laird and Rogers raised such questions as these: whether the Fishhook was really the best area to hit, in view of expected casualties of 1,000 for the first week, and how the Senate Foreign Relations Committee might be expected to react.

The President himself worked out Ellsworth Bunker and Gen. Creighton Abrams in Saigon, to check on their views. In essence, he asked: a) Was U.S. effort best directed at the base areas (sanctuaries), or at other operations within South Vietnam? b) If the answer to "a" was base areas, would the Fishhook be the best one to move against? Abrams and Bunker were told that the President had not made up his mind, and that their views would weigh heavily.

As he worked at the drafting, the President asked Kissinger to produce the plans he had for operations against every enemy base area. Kissinger, in turn, phoned Laird, asking him to forward the plans he had for operations against base areas other than the Parrot's Beak and the Fishhook, plus any other recommendations he had, by the end of the day.

Earlier in the morning, the President had decided to go on television to explain his decision. He was not yet firm about the operation at the Fishhook, but the reasoning was that any incursion into Cambodia, whether South Vietnamese or American, would require a presidential explanation.

That afternoon, at the President's request, Kissinger checked with another senior senator. He won't say who, but informed White House sources report that the second senator to be briefed on what the President was considering was John J. Williams, Republican of Delaware, and the fifth-ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Reportedly, Williams did not view the incursions favorably. White House sources do not know of any other legislators who were called.

The President was back in his EOB office at 5:18, and on the telephone. He missed talking to Sen. Robert Dole of Kansas, but spoke with Mrs. Nixon, John Mitchell, aides William Timmons and Harry Dent, Ehrlichman, Kissinger, Haldeman and Norman Vincent Peale. The President ate dinner alone at his desk. He was very close to making up his mind.

Kissinger went to dinner that evening at the Brookings Institution in Washington. Among the other topics raised by senior Japanese and American academicians that night was why the U.S. was doing nothing about Cambodia. Kissinger listened silently.

Tuesday, April 28

THE PRESIDENT met with John Mitchell, Haldeman and Kissinger at 9:32 a.m. He told them there would be incursions against both the Parrot's Beak and the Fishhook. Since the Fishhook operation required U.S. troops, they could also be used at the Parrot's Beak. The President said that his mind was made up, and that he was taking full responsibility. He said that he was about to inform Secretaries Laird and Rogers of his decision, and that he wanted to do so in the presence of the Attorney General, but without members of the White House staff present. Haldeman and Kissinger left at 10:09, as Rogers and Laird arrived.

At 11:20, the President told Kissinger what he had said to the three Cabinet officers. He added that the time for discussion was over, that it was time to move. The two discussed the planning for the operations. The one against the Parrot's Beak would jump off that night.

That afternoon, Kissinger formed a six-man group from his own staff, telling them they would be his planning group for the Cambodian operations. They were to think of every conceivable question that WSAG would have to answer.

From 12:34 to 1:18, the President went over his plans with Vice President Agnew. At 3:09, the President sat down in the Cabinet Room for a meeting with 16 representatives of 12 military groups: the National Guard Association, the Navy League, the Reserve Officers Association, the Retired Officers Association, the Air Force Association, the American Ordnance Association, Association of the United States Army, the Marine Corps League, the National Rifle Association, the Military Order of the World Wars, the American Security Council and the Fleet Reserve Association.

The meeting was not set in response to the President's Cambodian decision. It had been previously scheduled to brief the members on the ABM and on the situation in Southeast Asia.

The President described enemy activity in Cambodia. Without revealing the decision he had made hours before, he said he was going to take strong action, and that he would be announcing what it was soon. At one point, he gestured to the Air Force

and said, "These boys are going to be busy." He said he had had a wide range of suggestions as to what to do, some

suggestions as to what to do, some more extreme than the steps he was taking. He said he hoped that if the men present agreed with his decision, he would have their support.

WSAG met for two hours that afternoon. U. Alexis Johnson and Marshall Green had been told of the President's decision by Rogers; and David Packard and General Wheeler, by Laird. Kissinger had phoned Helms.

The Fishhook operation was to jump off at 1930 hours (7:30) Thursday night, April 30. Starting from that point, WSAG worked backward to the present, detailing hour by hour

what was to happen, under these headings: TIME, ACTION, RESPONSIBLE AGENCY, COMMENTS. The finished "scenario" would be packaged into a three-ring red binder marked "Top Secret."

The President stopped into the WSAG meeting at 4:50 p.m., on his way to the White House barbershop. He gave the group a short pep talk. After his haircut, he spent 15 minutes dictating to Rose Mary Woods. He was beginning to write what he would later say on television.

At 5:42, Mr. Nixon had Ehrlichman bring him up to date on domestic events. On a fast-paced walk across the south lawn of the White House, he told Ehrlichman that one of the principal elements in his decision was the expectation that the incursions would save American lives in the long run. The President talked about how the North Vietnamese retained the capability of inflicting casualties on the U.S. at almost any level they desired, and how the U.S. had to deny them that capability. The President said he recognized there were reasons not to invade Cambodia, including the likelihood that the "get out now" forces (Ehrlichman's phrase) would be strengthened. The President went over with Ehrlichman the list of people who had to see him on domestic matters, saying he wanted another few days to concentrate on Cambodia.

That evening, Kissinger had a drink with the President. Sipping a Scotch and soda, the President discussed his speech. Kissinger had, by this time, sent material to presidential speechwriter Patrick Buchanan, who was working on an outline.

At 10:09 that evening, the President called Kissinger to inquire if the South Vietnamese and U.S. troops had jumped off at the Parrot's Beak. They had. The President and Kissinger

discussed the timing of the Administration's announcement. Since the Saigon government would not be making its announcement until the next morning, the two men decided to wait for the press inquiry that was sure to come soon thereafter.

Wednesday, April 29

KISSINGER met with his own internal planning group, then with WSAG for 45 minutes. He saw the President from 11:46 a.m. to 12:34 p.m., reporting on the progress of planning and going over the outline of the speech the President would make the next night.

Former Gov. Thomas E. Dewey of New York joined Kissinger for lunch in his office. Over food sent in from the White House Mess, Kissinger briefed Dewey and got a favorable response. Dewey is an informal unpaid consultant to the President on foreign affairs. In the case of Cambodia, he had not been an adviser.

Just before his lunch with Dewey, Kissinger had received a call from Senate Republican Whip Robert Griffin of Michigan. Griffin said that there were reports coming in on news wires of a South Vietnamese attack into Cambodia. Were they true? Kissinger confirmed the reports and stressed the limited nature of the U.S. involvement. There was no discussion of the operation to come at the Fishhook. Acting that day on behalf of Sen. Hugh Scott, the GOP Minority Leader, who was ill, Griffin expressed his concern that the Senate leadership was learning about the operation from news reports.

At 6:10 p.m., Kissinger and Halde- man briefed the senior White House staff about the Parrot's Beak operation. The secret had been closely held, and only a few had a vague idea that something big was happening.

The President worked through the day, concentrating on the speech. He had dinner that night with his family at 7:15, talked with Kissinger, and spent nearly an hour in the Lincoln Sitting Room. Rose Mary Woods sat on the couch to the left of his chair. They both had copies of a draft of the speech. They went through them together, noting small corrections. Occasionally, the President would dictate a new sentence or paragraph.

Miss Woods returned to her own office, and the President worked on. He took a ten-minute "personal" call from Gov. Nelson Rockefeller of New York. He volleyed calls with Kissin-

ger, and spoke for seven minutes with the Rev. Billy Graham. At 12:01 a.m., he called Miss Woods and told her he did not think he would work any more on the speech that night. After one final call to Kissinger, the President went to bed. At 1:15, he was back up. Sitting alone in the Lincoln Sitting Room, he worked until 4:45 a.m.

Thursday, April 30

THE PRESIDENT was in his office at 9:05 a.m. His course was fixed, and he alternated meetings throughout the day with Haldeman and Kissinger. The speech was set for 9:00 p.m., Daylight Saving Time.

In the early afternoon, the President took Kissinger and Haldeman into the small private office off the Oval Office. Sitting slumped down in his chair, he read the speech through to them. They offered only small comments. At some point during the day, the President used his pen to write an addition in black ink. After the phrase, "I would rather be a one-term President," he wrote, "and do what I believe is right."

Kissinger chaired the last meeting of WSAG on Cambodia at 3:50 p.m. Now, it was only a matter of wrapping up loose ends. He also briefed AFL-CIO President George Meany and got Meany's endorsement.

At 6:00 p.m., Kissinger and Halde- man briefed the senior White House staff again, this time including the big American push at the Fishhook.

At Federal Office Building #7, White House Special Counsel Charles Colson briefed the military representatives the President had seen Tuesday, plus representatives of other groups, including the Young Americans for Freedom, the Citizens' Committee to Safeguard America, Catholic War Veterans, the Association of Student Governments, the Jewish War Veterans and the Washington Campus News Service.

In the White House theater, the President himself outlined his plans for the assembled congressional leadership, Republican and Democratic, and the Cabinet. At the end of the briefing, the President said he knew that everyone in the room could not support him in his move into Cambodia. Calling Sen. Mansfield "Mike," he remembered aloud how many things they had worked on together. There was a similar mention for Sen. J. William Fulbright.

As the President left to prepare for television, he stopped on his way to the door and talked about his coming appearance. He said he had heard that the way he looked on television might have had something to do with the outcome of the 1960 election, and that in 1961, an enthusiastic young Republican woman in Illinois had told him: "Mr. Nixon, it's just too bad for television that you can't do something about your face." A chuckle. Then he headed through the door as his audience, many of whom would be disagreeing with him the next day, stood and applauded.

In the Oval Office, light makeup in place, the President sat behind his desk to give the TV cameramen a chance to focus. He joked with them, then went to his private office and glanced over the speech for the last time, from 8:40 until 8:58. Then he re-entered the Oval Office and sat down in front of the cameras. END

U.S. HAS SPIES IN THE SKY STATE SOVIETS

[Article by Maj Gen Avn B. Aleksandrov and Col A. Yur'yev: "The Space Network of Espionage"; (Based on Foreign Press Material); Moscow, SMENA, No 13, July 1970, pp 22-23]

"Suddenly I heard a dull explosion and saw an orange glow, the plane heeled over and, it seemed to me, the wings and tail assembly fell off..."

That is the way American pilot F. Powers recalled the last seconds of his espionage career. His high altitude U-2 reconnaissance plane crashed on 1 May 1960 from an altitude of 20 kilometers.

Together with it also crashed the hopes of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency for using aerial spies for reconnaissance of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. The Soviet Armed Forces reliably protected the route used by foreign reconnaissance aircraft in the air space of the Land of the Soviets. And then those in charge of U.S. intelligence fixed their eyes on space.

Officially the Pentagon never mentions their space reconnaissance program. The Western press, however, in commenting on this aspect of the U.S. Defense Department's activities cites the following facts.

The U.S. began to launch reconnaissance artificial earth satellites in 1960. All launches were made from the Vandenberg Missile Range (Calif.). This range made it possible to launch satellites on a polar or near polar orbit. From this orbit the satellites could cross the Soviet Union and countries of the Socialist community very frequently. Between 1961 and 1969 the U.S. launched more than 250 reconnaissance satellites - more than 30 a year.

What type of missions are assigned to spy satellites? All of them have a special purpose - obtain military and economic information on the defensive might of the USSR and other countries of the Socialist camp, constantly observe the construction of military and industrial targets; reveal the location and disposition of aircraft at airfields, ships at bases and other military equipment; check on the activity at missile ranges and the launching of ballistic missiles from those ranges, reveal the air defense system, and monitor radio transmissions between military headquarters.

The Americans consider that the most effective method of getting documentary information is by photographing targets from space. Modern photographic equipment for this type of reconnaissance, and also the highly sensitive fine-grained types of film provide a sufficiently high degree of effectiveness. In the U.S., for example, a camera has been developed with a focal length of over six meters. Such a camera from an altitude of approximately 120 kilometers can photograph any object down to a minimal size of two meters. Cameras with an even greater focussing capability are being developed with which it will be possible to photograph from an even higher altitude. These cameras are compact and small-scale as the result of a so-called "folding optic," and also as a result of the prism and periscope devices. Clouds, however, can interfere with photographing from space. It is not possible to photograph at night.

Several modifications of Samos satellites are used in the U.S. for

space photo espionage. The Americans launched the first of these satellites in 1961. The most prevalent Samos model has a diameter of 1.5 and a length of 6.6 meters and weighs between 1,360 and 1,800 kilograms. In design the Samos is mated with the last stage of the Agena booster.

The Samos is intended primarily for carrying out two missions: survey type photo reconnaissance of large areas and reconnaissance of specific objectives.

Satellites used for survey type reconnaissance are equipped, as a rule, with a system of wide-angle cameras with a small focal length and a relatively small resolution capability. From a high altitude they can cover an area 150-800 kilometers wide. Such satellites are equipped with television equipment which transmits information to ground stations even though the satellite has gone beyond the limits of direct visibility. The capabilities of modern television cameras can be judged by the pictures obtained with the apparatus on Lunar-Orbiter 5. From an altitude of approximately 150 kilometers it "observed" the track made on the moon by a rolling rock which was about 4.5 meters in size.

Satellites for survey reconnaissance are launched on a circular polar orbit at an altitude of 300-480 kilometers using a Thor-Agena booster. The lifetime of the satellite is 20-25 days.

According to reports in the foreign press a new modification of the Samos has been created in the U.S. for reconnaissance of specific objectives. The New Zealand journal Wings reports that since July 1966 the U.S. has been launching an improved model Samos. With the help of a special engine upon command from earth it can change the orbital parameters.

All types of Samos satellites carry a minimum of two cameras. The optical axis of one is directed to earth and of the other to the sky. This accurately orients the photos taken. On the latest models of the Samos satellites there are special radio-electronic sensors. If the photographic target is covered by clouds these sensors automatically shut off the cameras.

The capabilities for photo reconnaissance of spy satellites also depend on the amount of photographic film. The latest models of the Samos carried six containers of film, each of which weighed more than 135 kilograms.

And now something about how the operation of the equipment on satellites of this type is controlled and how the exposed film is picked up. The satellites are controlled from the Sunnyvale (Calif.) Control Center. Seven tracking stations receive information from these satellites, and perform the processing and analysis. Some of them are located in the Hawaiian Islands and at Kodiak (Aleutian Islands), at Grenier Air Base (in the U.S.) and in Japan.

When the satellite is located over the points to be reconnoitered, the control center turns on the cameras. Then, by command, the container with the exposed film is ejected from the satellite toward the earth. After separation, a special engine shifts the orbiting container into a descent trajectory. The heat shield protects the container from temperature overheating in the dense layers of the atmosphere. The speed of the descent is diminished by means of a braking ribbon-parachute. A radiobeacon is mounted on the container, from which metallized strips are dropped. All this permits rapid location of the container with the help of radar. At an altitude of approximately 17 thousand meters, the container, from which the protective covering has been automatically separated, descends on a main orange parachute. The estimated splash-down point of the container, according to press reports, is in the Pacific Ocean, approximately 300 kilometers from the Hawaiian Islands. Several C-130 aircraft fly into the splash-down area and with the help of a special trawl net intercept the container in mid-air or retrieve it from the water. When all six containers have returned to the earth, the radar stations bring down the satellite. The equipment installed in it may be used a second time.

As the American press affirms, it is possible to obtain very clear photographs with these photosatellites. On these photographs one can see not only airfields, naval bases, and ICBM positions, but one can also count the number and determine the types of aircraft and combat vessels.

According to evidence of American scientific observers, paramount importance is now also attached to radio-technical reconnaissance from space.

Radio interception in all its forms can, in the opinion of foreign specialists, give intelligence officers very important data on the state of the

enemy's armed forces, disclose the disposition of enemy troops, headquarters, and command posts, determine air defense capabilities, etc.

The capabilities of radio-technical reconnaissance with satellites are, in the opinion of foreign specialists, varied and vast. Their modern radio-technical apparatuses allegedly determine the number, disposition, and technical characteristics of the enemy's radar stations. They afford the possibility of monitoring command post radio communications with ships and submarines and also troop radio traffic. According to several reports, satellites can transmit to the earth information which they, in turn, "collect" from agents who have been dropped on the territory of a particular country.

Radio-technical reconnaissance in the U.S. is conducted by the Ferret satellites--one of the variants of the already well-known Samos satellites. The Ferrets are launched by a Thor-Agena booster into circular polar orbits with an altitude of 400-700 kilometers. Their life span is several years. Satellites of this type do not return to the earth. Mechanisms on board intercept and record electromagnetic signals and radio traffic. Then, upon establishment of direct ultra-shortwave communications with ground stations, the information obtained is transmitted to control centers for interpretation and processing.

The leaders of the U.S. intelligence services pinned great hopes on the Midas type satellites, which were equipped with infrared reconnaissance equipment. The Pentagon used them to help learn where the ballistic missile launching sites are located in the USSR.

In the course of three years, beginning from 1961, the U.S. launched seven Midas satellites into elongated elliptical polar orbits. The altitude of their

apogee was up to 4,800 kilometers, their perigee--over 500.

The American press pointed out that in 1963 with the help of the Midas satellites the Armed Forces commanders plotted the launches of Atlas and Titan missiles from the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific missile test ranges. However, in spite of the vast expenditures (the cost of the system was several billion dollars), the setting-up of a reliable Midas system did not work out. The satellites' equipment could not precisely determine the launching site of the rockets. The resolution capability of the infrared detectors proved to be extremely low; they did not distinguish between the heat radiation of the rockets and the radiation of the sun. At present, U.S. research organizations have created new models of such equipment. They are being tested on U.S. missile test ranges.

In the U.S. there has been created and is functioning still another artificial earth satellite system, known as "Vela-Hotel"--a radiation space reconnaissance complex. The system is capable of detecting nuclear explosions on the earth's surface and in space. It consists of six satellites and monitors the radiation situation in space and reports it to the control center on earth. The satellites of the Vela-Hotel system are equipped with special optical sensors and can, according to foreign press reports, detect nuclear explosions of one megaton force at a distance of up to 3×10^8 kilometers. However, with such a system it is impossible to collect information on underground and underwater nuclear explosions.

U.S. research centers are developing a new type of spy-satellite under the code name "949." In 1970, 167 million dollars were allocated for this program. As the American press reports, the new satellite should be a multi-purpose one,

i.e., it will simultaneously conduct photoreconnaissance, detect ballistic missile launches, and record the explosions of nuclear devices. Practical launches of the "949" type satellites are expected in 1971...

What can one say as a conclusion to this survey?

As you have seen, for the past decade there has appeared in the arsenal of the American militarists a new means of espionage--artificial earth satellites. In spite of their many shortcomings, American intelligence has obtained the possibility of collecting information on the military and economical potential and defense strengths of the socialist countries. The task of all Soviet people, each on his own post, consists in the fact that this possibility should not become a reality. The great vigilance of the Soviet people is the true guarantee of success in the struggle with the space spies.